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We study the determinants of governments and legislatures’ survival in Italy from the unification to the end of 
the I Republic (1861-1994) - excluding the fascist period and the subsequent transitory institutional period, 
"Constituente" (1946-1948).  
We test whether institutional features such as electoral systems, form of State and extent of suffrage had any 
effect on the survival of legislatures and governments. We control for voting power of the parliamentary 
groups, number of parties represented in the parliament and size of the representative bodies. 
Unlike the political economy wisdom, we show that, over the whole period, governments and legislatures’ 
survivals are inversely related to the plurality electoral system. The restricted suffrage and a high voting power 
of the leading parties reduce the risk of anticipated end of governments.  
The survival of the legislatures is related to the form of state (republic) and to the voting power of the leading 
party.  
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1. Introduction  
In this paper we analyze the “struggle for survival” of governments and legislatures of the Italian democratic 
parliaments, from the creation of the Italian state (1861) up to 1994, with the exclusion of the fascist period 
(i.e., the legislatures from 1924 to 1945 in which the democratic institutions were absent and of the subsequent 
transitory institutional period, known as "Constituente", lasting until 1948). We consider whether the survival 
of Italian governments and legislatures was related to different electoral systems, to the voting power of the 
various political groups, to the number of parliamentary groups and to the size of the representative bodies. We 
also consider whether it was relevant for the parliament and the government to be in a constitutional Monarchy, 
with an elective Chamber and a Senate appointed by the King as in the 1861-1924 period, or in a non 
presidential Republic, with two elective chambers as in the 1948-1994 period; and whether the extent of the 
suffrage had any effect. 
In this respect, the political economy literature1 is pervaded by the thesis that the proportional electoral 
system is the main cause of political “fragmentation” of the governance via the numerousness of parties in the 
government coalitions, assumed to be a typical feature of the proportional electoral systems in contrast with the 
majoritarian electoral system. According to Alesina and Perotti (1994) “proportional, representational electoral 
system typically create multiparty systems and coalition governments; on the contrary, majoritarian systems 
lead to single party governments”. Proportional representation also determines the short-life of governments 
because “governments durability is lower in representational systems characterised by coalition governments”: 
by preventing the emergence of a leading-party the proportional electoral system implies higher fragmentation 
and short-living governments; this makes it difficult to reach an agreement on the governance and determines 
the delay of political decisions and actions. Roubini and Sachs (1989a and 1989b) argue that a short lived 
government only cares of the short horizon of the effects of its actions and it is induced to short-sighted policies 
which pre-empt the possibilities of the subsequent governments of pursuing their own different policies. 
According to Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991), short lived governments and instability, caused by 
political fragmentation of coalitions of parties, prevent long run programs. Alesina and Perotti (1994)2 argue 
that this type of situation might be irrelevant in calm periods, but becomes negatively crucial in critical 
situations such as those determined by economic shocks and subsequent crises. More recently, Persson and 
Tabellini (2003), with a panel including a huge group of countries from all the continents have found a number 
of peculiar effects determined by electoral rules. Countries under plurality electoral system cut taxes and 
spending ahead of elections, whereas countries with proportional electoral systems expand welfare programs in 
election years and further expand these programs in the years immediately following the elections. 
Furthermore, plurality reduces not only government ineffectiveness but also corruption by creating stronger 
incentives for politicians not to use their office for private gain.3 
                                                     
1 See, for example, the surveys by Alesina and Perotti (1994) and Persson and Tabellini (2003). 
 
2 Alesina and Perotti (1994) support their view on fragmentation on the basis of Drazen and Grilli (1993), Grilli, 
Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991). 
 
3 One might argue that corruption is a function of the struggle for survival and, therefore, short living legislatures and 
governments, because of the higher frequency of the competitive struggle for their survival determine more corruption. 
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The above theories of fragmentation and instability basically supported by political economy scholars 
are not supported by sociologists and political scientists. Already in the ‘70s it was recognized that fragmented 
democracy can be as stable as the non fragmented (Lijphart, 1968). Sartori (1982) when asking why some 
democracy is stable and endures, whereas some other has difficult life or dies, does not focus merely on 
fragmentation of the party system: this fragmentation, per se, does explain almost nothing unless it is 
considered in connection with polarization. Low polarization makes the governance of a democratic system 
viable even if its party system is fragmented, the structure of its own cleavages is segmented, and its own 
political culture is not homogeneous. According to Sartori fragmentation and multiplicity of parties do originate 
coalition governments, but governing coalitions are not necessarily unstable and unworkable. If coalitions are 
made up of similar/close political parties, which assure continuity, they might work satisfactorily. In this 
respect Laver (2000)4 summarizes the key results obtained by political scientist as follows: (i) Coalition 
governments and even minority governments need not be weak and unstable. Both empirical and theoretical 
researches show that coalition governments can be stable equilibrium responses to electoral results by which no 
party has an absolute majority. Minority governments may also be stable equilibrium responses to particular 
government formation situations. The parties making up minority governments often tend to be quite large and 
quite central in policy terms. (ii) Parties’ policy plays a remarkable role in the making and breaking of 
governments. There is a fear of coalition governments, considered anti-democratic, because citizens vote for 
parties at election time, but parties are forced by coalition bargaining to modify their policies after the elections 
if they want to get into office: both empirical and theoretical researches have shown that the resulting policy 
accommodations are almost invariably centripetal.5 (iii) Both the formation and the durability of governments 
are heavily conditioned by the institutional environment.6  
In section 2 we shall consider some stylised facts from the Italian democratic history on which basis we 
shall single out the variables of interest for the analysis of the Italian democratic parliament. In section 3, we 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Moreover, the struggle for survival might also imply policies of tax reduction to entice electors belonging to the right or 
welfare programs to entice the electors from the left. 
 
4 The wide political science literature on the formation and duration of governments basically follows two approaches. The 
first, essentially empirical (e.g., Blondel and Muller-Rommell, 1993; Browne and Dreijmanis, 1982; Lijphart, 1984; 
Pridham, 1986; Strom, 1985; Warwick, 1994), aims at singling out a set of variables relevant for the government duration 
in the real world. The second is characterized by a priori modelling of government formation. A first variant of the latter is 
“institution free” and aims at solving problems as the creation of a majority for an investiture vote (e.g., Axelrod, 1970; 
Grofman, 1982; McKelvey and Schofield, 1986, 1987; Peleg, 1981; Riker, 1962; Schofield, 1993). A second variant, 
developed within the “new institutionalist” approach, views the governments’ formation process and governments’ 
duration as a product of specific institutional rules (e.g., Austen-Smith and Banks, 1988, 1990; Baron, 1991; Huber, 1996; 
Laver and Shepsle, 1996; Lupia and Strom, 1995).   
 
5 Parties may change their policies, but the beneficiary is almost invariably the median voter (see, e.g., Laver and Shepsle, 
1996; Schofield, 1993). Coalition bargaining, therefore, can make more voters more happy than they were before (Austen-
Smith and Banks, 1990; Baron, 1991, Huber, 1996; Laver and Shepsle, 1996, Schofield, 1993). 
 
6 Amongst other, the institutional features analysed include the role of formal investiture votes (Strom, 1990); rules for 
choosing formateurs (Austen-Smith and Banks, 1988; Baron, 1991); the role of confidence and no-confidence procedures 
(Huber, 1996); the rules of cabinet governance, in particular, the relationship between collective cabinet responsibility and 
individual ministerial responsibility for specified policy portfolios (Laver and Shepsle, 1996).  
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empirically test the determinants of governments and legislatures’ length by means of survival analysis. 
Conclusions follow in section 4. 
 
2. The determinants of governments and legislatures’ survival 
2.1. Some stylised facts on the electoral systems in Italy 
In Italy, since the creation of the parliament of the Italian Kingdom, in 1861, different electoral systems have 
been adopted. The pure uninominal electoral system, with some exception, was in place until 1919. After the 
interruption of the democracy, in the new republican period (since 1948) the pure proportional electoral system 
took place and lasted until the elections of 1994, when a hybrid form of majoritarian with a proportional share 
was introduced. But the electoral system changed again in 2006 into a hybrid  form of proportional electoral 
system with a majority premium for the winning coalition. Therefore, for the analysis of the behaviour of the 
Italian parliament, only the sequence of governments and legislatures since 1861 until 1994 allows us to 
properly test the propositions of the literature related to the role of electoral system. In particular, we analyze 
the sequence of the Italian governments and parliaments in the nineteen democratic legislatures of the 1861-
1924 monarchic period over 63 years (the elective chamber of deputies only, because the senate was non 
elective) and in the eleven legislatures of the Republic, from 1948 to 1994, i.e., over a total period of 109 years. 
Table 1 summarizes the basic features of the periods considered.7  
 
Table 1. The Italian Governments and legislatures: summary statistics 
  
Number of 
legislatures 
average 
duration of 
legislatures (in 
days) 
Number of 
governments 
average 
duration of 
governments
(in days) 
average duration of 
governments (subsequent 
governments with the same 
premier are joint)
MONARCHY (1861-1924) 
(pure plurality + mixed system-
basically proportional) 19 1229 60 362 505 
PURE PLURALITY SYSTEM 14 1227 48 350 494 
PROPORTIONAL SYSTEM BY 
SCRUTINY OF LIST 5 990 12 412 550 
      
REPUBLIC (pure proportional) 
1948-1994 11 1525 47 322 504 
PROPORTIONAL SYSTEM 
(mixed system + pure proportional) 16 1358 59 340 515 
 
 
During the monarchic period, the pure majoritarian electoral system did last from 1861 to 1882, for 
seven legislatures, and from 1892 to 1919, for seven additional legislatures, with a total of 14 legislatures in 47 
years, with an average survival of 494 days each).8 In the 14 legislatures considered, there were 48 
                                                     
7 Tables A1 and A2 in appendix show in details of the sequence of governments (and the prime minister) in the considered 
legislatures, by separating, respectively, Monarchy and Republic and indicating the duration (in days) of governments and 
legislatures. 
 
8 Of these legislatures, 4 were shorter than two years (IX legislature of 15 months – from November 1865 to February 
1867 –; XII legislature of 23 months – from November 1874 to October 1876 –; XVII legislature of 21 months – from 
December 1890 to September 1892– ; XIX legislature of 21 months – from June 1895 to March 1897–). 
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governments, on average, about 3 for each legislature. Under the quasi proportional system of the monarchic 
period (lasting from November 1882 to September 1892), there were 3 legislatures over 10 years, with an 
average survival of 1167 days each. The six governments survived on average 583 days. Under the proportional 
system with universal suffrage lasting about 4 years (from December of 1919 to January 1924), the legislature 
were 2 with an average survival of about 2 years each, and the governments were 6, with an average survival of 
about 8 months each. Overall, the non majoritarian periods (from November 1882 to September 1892, and from 
December 1919 to January 1924) had 5 legislatures in about 14 years, with an average survival of 990 days 
each, less than the survival of the legislatures under the majoritarian system (1227 days). There were 12 
governments in 14 years, with an average survival of 412 days, slightly longer than that under the majoritarian 
system. Thus, in the monarchic period the majoritarian system determined a longer average duration of the 
parliaments in comparison with the proportional system, but the same did not occur for the survival of the 
governments, which is similar under the two electoral systems with a duration slightly longer for the 
governments under the proportional system. However, the plurality system gave these results in a period of 47 
years of restricted suffrage. The results under the proportional system are an average of data of a limited period 
of 10 years under restricted suffrage and in an even shorter period of 4 years of male universal suffrage. Let us 
then consider the republican period of 46 years under the pure proportional system from April 1948 to April 
1994. In this long period there were only two unusually short legislatures: the first from July 1976 to June 1979 
and the second from April 1992 to April 1994. On average, the 11 legislatures in 46 years survived 1525 days, 
about 10 months less than the “physiologic” survival of 5 years set by the law. The number of governments, 
however, was 47 in 46 years, thus, confirming the average duration of the governments under the proportional 
electoral laws of the monarchic period.  
Notice, however, that the number of governments as such, under the Italian parliamentary system, may 
be misleading because, under the existing rule both in the monarchic and the republican period, there is a 
formal change of government every time a given premier is charged by the head of state for “reshuffling” the 
cabinet, with some change of its composition, even if its political majority does not change. If one considered, 
as the same government, all the governments with the same prime minister succeeding to himself, into the same 
legislature,9 under the plurality system the average survival of governments is 494 days, whereas under the 
proportional systems it becomes 515 days. Therefore, in the long run, an inverse relation seems to emerge 
between majoritarian system and governments’ duration, in comparison with that under the proportional 
electoral system. Obviously, one might object that the majoritarian system we are considering was in place in a 
Monarchic period, mostly with limited suffrage. However, Monarchy and limited suffrage do not appear to be 
institutions adding instability to the governments. On the contrary, one might well argue that they have the 
opposite influence (see below). In any case, both with a pure formal and with a substantial definition of 
governments’ duration, the thesis that the proportional system reduces the duration of governments and of 
parliaments has no empirical support in the 109 years of the Italian democracy under consideration. And the 
                                                     
9 Notice, however, that according to Laver and Schofield (1991), the termination of a government would also be either the 
change of party membership of the cabinet, or the formal government resignation, or a change of the prime minister and 
election. 
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same occurs for the related thesis that plurality electoral systems tend to generate long-life governments and 
parliaments. Other factors may, therefore, be relevant in explaining the different survival of governments and 
legislatures.  
 
2.2. The fragmentation of the Italian Parliament from 1861 to 1994 and the role of the political parties  
Duverger (1954) formulated a kind of “natural law of politics” according to which “dualism” in politics is 
natural. On this basis, quite often the West party-systems have been classified into two basic sytems – biparty 
and pluriparty – basically meaning that any system can be interpreted dualistically, by opposing, say, left to 
right, majority to opposition… and the like. On the other side, Sartori (1982) recognises that West Europe is 
often characterised by the “three party system”.10 In situations like the Italian, the main feature is a multi-polar 
system with the existence of a party (or group of parties) able to capture the opinion of the centre (not 
necessarily metrically between left and right). This situation does not allow the principle of alternate 
governments, but only semiperipheral reshuffling to the power.11 According to this view, in Italy 
semiperipheral reshuffling has meant that the centre (the dominant party or a coalition of parties) has originally 
ruled without substitution. The extreme wing parties, in spite of their electoral weight (recall that the 
Communist party, PCI, in some legislatures got even 30% of seats), were almost never in the position of 
becoming ruling parties and the minor parties likely to be part of the ruling coalition had a minor influence and 
some time even for mere arithmetic reasons.12  
In this context, any coalition of minor parties with the main party is possible a priori. One might object 
that this assumption is unrealistic, because there are parties ideologically idiosyncratic to each other. However, 
if one considers the Italian experience, in both the monarchic and republican periods, the coalitions of 
ideologically heterogeneous political groups were not rare under either electoral regime. The term 
“transformismo” was actually forged to design governments presided by right wing leaders13 or with important 
right wing ministers and left wing majorities aided by right wing minorities and vice versa.14 For the republican 
period, in the ’70s the Democratic Christian party, DC, institutionalised a “grand coalition” with the Italian 
                                                     
10 That is, pluralism can be simple (biparty), moderate, extreme. Substantially, Sartori says that tracing the world back to a 
bipolar view is wrong and that Duverger excludes the existence of a “centre”, only because centre parties are in contrast 
with his theory. 
 
11 In other words, a biparty system allows alternate governments, a moderate pluralism allows alternate coalitions, extreme 
pluralism allows semiperipheral reshuffling, with the alternation limited to the minor parties only. 
 
12 According to Sartori, in certain periods of the Italian history, the first consequence of this situation is an opposition 
without responsibility, because the opposition can never become majority. The further consequence might be that the 
likely allies of the main party are only (slightly) more responsible than the opposition, because only mere arithmetic 
reasons make them likely to become part of ruling coalition. Nevertheless, when in power the (minor) allies, being likely 
to become opposition again, because of the semiperipheral reshuffling, are less responsible of the government political 
action. In other words, for the minor parties, the lower the probability of becoming part of the ruling coalition, the higher 
the temptation of an irresponsible opposition. But, also, the higher the probability of becoming part of the ruling coalition, 
the higher the temptation of an irresponsible political action when in power.  
 
13 As the marquis Antonio Di Rudini three times in the XIX, XX and XXI legislatures. 
  
14 Urbano Rattazzi - who was prime minister twice, in the VIII and X legislatures, of important right wing governments - 
was originally known as a person with left wing ideas. 
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Communist Party, PCI, under the name of “historical compromise”. The international political constraints made 
it impossible to have a national government with communist ministers, but they did not prevent a government 
with the PCI as “external support” to the majority. 
Moreover, two important institutional factors relating to the functioning of the Italian Parliament must 
be considered to explain the semi-peripheral changes of the ruling coalition. Article 41 of the Statute of the 
Italian Kingdom stated that the “deputies represent the Nation in general and not the provinces in which they 
are elected. The electors cannot give them any agency constraint”. Similarly, the article 67 of the Italian 
Constitution states that “every member of the Parliament represents the Nation and exerts his functions without 
agency constraints with the electors”. According to the dominant traditional interpretation this principle allows 
the members of the parliament to vote disregarding their political (parliamentary) group. This possibility that 
emphasises the risks of losing power for a majority with a narrow margin over the majority quota – a feature 
quite independent of the type of electoral system. Another important principle of the Statute of Italian Kingdom 
allowing combinations amongst different political groups was that of the article 52, by which the vote both in 
the Chamber and in the Senate, in principle, was an open vote, but ten members could ask for secret ballots. A 
similar rule was adopted in the internal regulations of Chamber and Senate in the Italian Republic until August 
1988. The secret ballot allowed the formation of various parliamentary coalitions, sometime different from that 
officially supporting the government in charge and rendered very difficult for the leading parties to rule without 
large majorities.15  
If the above picture captures the main features of the Italian parliamentary system since 1861 to 1994, it 
seems to us that the proper way to analyse it is to consider the parties’ voting powers as determined by the 
Shapley-Shubik (S-S) index that measures the probability of any given voter of belonging to a winning 
coalition. Following the game theoretic approach underlying the S-S index of voting power,16 we interpret the 
political groups represented (elected) in each branch of the Parliament as the players of a “game to stay in 
power” and assume that any political group - the players of the game - may combine opportunistically with any 
other, even disregarding their ideological differences. The notion of power of a player is referred to his ability 
to be the “last decisive” or marginal (“pivot”) player of a winning coalition over all the possible coalitions.17 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
15 The secret ballot principle, unrelated to the type of electoral system, originated the practice of the so called “snipers”. 
 
16 See Shapley-Shubik (1954). 
 
17 The S-S index of voting power measures the chances of any party or player of being the pivotal member of a winning 
coalition as follows. Consider a n-players co-operative game defined by means of a characteristic-function, v: Α )1,0(→ , 
where Α  is the set of all n2  subset of the set of players N, (1,..,n) and v assigns to each subset ∈A Α   the value 1 if A is 
a winning coalition and 0 if it is a losing coalition. The S-S power index, S-S(i), for a player i can be defined as 
{} ] ) i- v(C-[v(C)
n!
c)!-(n1)!-(c
 S(i)-S ,
∑
⊂∈= NCCi   
where the summation is taken over all coalitions C (consisting of c members), which i belongs to and ‘!’ denotes factorial. 
A crucial role in the index is played by the permutations of players. We need to count for all 2n coalitions the number of 
permutations of the remaining n-c members, i.e. only those cases in which {} 0] ) i- v(C-[v(C) ≠ , that is, i is pivotal (his 
participation, as the last coming player, can change a losing coalition into winning coalition). In this sense, S-S(i) may be 
interpreted to represent both the possibility of measuring a player’s power or “value” by the abstract probability that he is 
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Given the number of seats and, thus, the voting weights of each party represented in the Parliament in 
each legislature, the S-S indexes have been worked out for all the democratic Italian legislatures from 1861 to 
1994. These values of the S-S indices are reported in appendix. Figure 1 shows the S-S power of the leading 
parties only (the biggest party in the government coalition) over the considered period. In the monarchic period, 
they are the Historical Right from 1861 (VIII legislature) up to 1876 (XII legislature) and  the Historical-left 
from the XIII legislature (1876-1880) to  XXVI legislature (1921-1924). Notice here that the monarchic period 
before the first world war was characterised by two leading parties: the historical right was formed mostly by 
free trade liberals, whereas the “historical” left, accepting some (protectionist) intervention of the state, was 
more open to the social reforms with a trend to the centre (as mentioned, the change of political positioning has 
been criticized as “transformismo”). In the Republican period, until 1994, only the Democratic Christian, DC, 
party had a dominant voting power. In this period the Senate became more relevant for government survival 
because the perfect bicameralism introduced by the Italian post-war Constitution entitled both branches to give 
the confidence vote to governments (see below).  
Unlike the conventional view of fragmentation, the values of the S-S index of the leading parties over 
the considered period show that, in all the Italian legislatures, with few exceptions there was almost always a 
party with a S-S value dominant over the other parties in the elected branches of the Parliament. Even in the 
Republican period considered – often criticized for government instability –, in particular since 1948 up to 
1976, the S-S value of the DC party was greater than 50%. In the subsequent legislatures the power of the DC 
declined, but an alternative majority without the DC was impossible. Moreover, with only two exceptions, all 
Presidents of the Republic belonged to DC. The two exceptions of a President belonging to the social 
democratic party, PSDI, and to the socialist party, PSI, were characterized by a strong alliance of these two 
parties with the DC in the government coalitions. This operated as a factor of stability. 
However, the parties and their power in the Parliament change through time and their consideration 
may provide important insights of the duration of governments and legislatures. Therefore our analysis shall 
also consider two other elements. First, the number of parties, being cause of political fragmentation according 
to the dominant beliefs should reduce the lengths of governments and legislatures. Second, under the same 
perspective, also the size of the assembly (e.g., the number of parliamentary seats) might be considered a 
variable favouring the political fragmentation, being related to the number of members of the parliament to be 
convinced to support the Government. However, the opposite effect might also occur because both variables 
might reduce the voting power of the individual voter (either political group or member of the parliament) and, 
therefore, help the survival of the government in charge, when supported by a small majority.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the pivotal member of a winning coalition and what a player should expect to receive, on average, under the assumption 
that his reward corresponds to his marginal contribution.  
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Figure 1. The Shapley-Shubick index of the leading parties all over the considered period in the Chamber of Deputies (and Senate since 1948) 
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2.3. The form of state and the extension of the suffrage  
In addition to the electoral systems (plurality vs. proportional), to the number of political parties in the 
parliament, and to the size of the assemblies (i.e., number of seats), the S-S voting powers as possible 
determinants of the duration of governments and legislatures, two other variables shall be considered. They are 
the form of state (monarchy vs. republic) and the extension of the suffrage (restricted vs. universal).  
The question on whether the existence of monarchic or republican state influences the duration of 
governments and legislatures is important for several reasons. First of all, in the monarchic period the leaders 
that should form  the governments were appointed by the King and they had to count on the confidence vote of 
the King to which that of the parliament was added. There were two branches, but, unlike the republican 
constitution, in the monarchy, the Senate (not elective) was appointed by the King under proposal of the head 
of the government. The Senate could approve or veto the ordinary laws and the budget, but it had no power of 
approval and dismissal of government by a confidence vote, because this power belonged to the King only. 
Furthermore, the King could influence the Chamber with “a party of the King” crossing the distinction among 
the political groups. The President of the Republic according to the present Italian Constitution has limited 
powers, much smaller than those of a constitutional King and these powers are accurately defined. 
Restricted vs universal suffrage might be relevant because the size of the electorate might have 
influenced the variation in the composition of the parliament because of a change of the active electorate. In 
1860 (up to 1882) the electoral law was that in force in Piedmont in 1848: the right of vote was only for male 
over 25, owning an income of at least 40 liras and not illitterate. The right of vote was also deserved to those 
having university degree, to teachers, public officials and to members of few other professional activities, either 
in office or retired. This corresponded to an active electorate of about  7-8% of male and to about  2% of the 
total population. The law n.725, 7/5/1882 enlarged the suffrage to those whose education was limited to the 
firsts two (compulsory) years of elementary school or to the regimental school and to those contributing to the 
financial support of the state because of their jobs or their savings (i.e. by means of compulsory yearly taxation 
of 19.80 liras). The minimum age requirement for active electorate was reduced to 21 years. In 1894, the law 
n.286 allowed for the exclusion of a citizen from the electoral register for notoriety of acts against the public 
order, the article of the previous law that allowed the vote to those showing of being able of writing and reading 
is abolished. The laws n.655 (30/6/1912) and n.648 (22/6/1913) re-affirms the principle of ability to vote. The 
voting right is extended to male over 30 even illiterate, and to those having done the military service for a given 
period (the active electorate increased from about 8.3% to about 23.2% of the total population). The law n. 
1985 16/12/1918 extended the voting right to male over 21 and to those who had been in the army. 
 
3. Survival analysis of government and legislatures  
We study the determinants of the Italian governments and legislatures’ duration by means of survival 
analysis for which the outcome variable of interest is time until an event occurs. By time we mean days from 
the beginning of the follow up of an individual (government or legislature) until the event = anticipated end 
occurs. Although, ideally, both the beginning and the failure dates of governments and legislatures should be 
known, censoring is a form of missing data problem that can be considered in this type of analysis. In 
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particular, right censoring occurs for those cases whose beginning date is known but who are still “alive” when 
they are lost to follow-up. Here we shall assume that right censoring occurs for those governments “still alive” 
at the natural end of the legislature and for legislatures not ending before their constitutional length (such as the 
long legislature of the first world war lasting 2136 days).  
 Survival models studying the time to the occurrence of an event, can be viewed as regression models in 
which the response variable is time.18 Here we refer to the Cox proportional hazards, PH, model that gives an 
expression for the hazard at time t for an individual with a given specification of a set of explanatory variables 
X. The model can be expressed as follows 
 
]exp[)(),( 0 ∑=
i
ii XthXth β  
 
That is, the Cox model formula is the product of two quantities: the baseline hazard function, )(0 th , and 
]exp[∑
i
ii Xβ  e.g., the exponential expression to the linear sum (with X being a vector of variables modelled to 
predict an individual’s hazard) that ensures that the fitted model will always give non-negative estimated 
hazard. The assumptions is that the baseline hazard is a function of t, but does not involve the predictors, in 
contrast to the exponential expression that might not involve t if the predictors are time independent. If all the 
predictors are equal to zero the formula reduce to the baseline function.19 The hazard function gives the 
instantaneous potential per unit time for the event to occur, given that the individual has survived up to time t, 
in contrast to the survivor function that focuses on not failing. Thus, the higher the average hazard the worse 
the impact on survival. Being a rate and not a probability the hazard ranges between zero and infinity.  
 
3.1. Survival analysis of government duration by Cox PH model 
The data set for the period considered contains the duration (in days) of each government. As mentioned, 
different definitions of government duration could be used. We refer to the legal notion of “new government” 
according to which the King or the President of the Republic registers than there is no longer a majority capable 
of expressing the existing government and charges a new or even the old premier to form a formally new 
government to get the confidence vote in the parliament even if sometime the new government is a 
“photocopy” of the previous one. This assumption helps in not to bias the results in favour of the proportional 
                                                     
18 Warwick (1994) applies the survival analysis as for the formation and persistence of stable and effective government 
majorities in fragmented multiparty democracies. Across a diverse set of parliamentary systems from 1945 to 1989, he 
finds two relevant explanations of reduction of cabinet duration. One is the ideological diversity (or destabilizing effect of 
intra-coalition policy conflicts). The other is the bargaining complexity that leads to instability by the multiplicity of 
coalition options. Other characteristics, including economic conditions (unemployment and inflation), are also 
investigated. The main result is, however, that ideological diversity, more than bargaining complexity, does matter as a 
destabilizing factor of governments. 
 
19 Notice that )(0 th g  is an unspecified function and this allows the model, which uses a minimum assumptions, to be 
suitable for a wide variety of data situation. It is a “robust” model in that it closely approximate the result for the correct 
(parametric) model, that should be instead preferred only when we are sure of the correctness of the underlying 
distribution as for the estimated hazard ratio and survival curve. For a discussion of the actractiveness of the Cox model 
see Kleinbaum and Klein (2005). 
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system that, as seen in table 1, in Italy shows a longer governments’ length when subsequent governments are 
led by the same premier and the same coalition into the same legislature. The failure, under our assumption, is 
simply taken to be any legal end of government before the legal end of the legislature. Truncation (right 
censoring) occurs for the last government of a legislature lasting more than 1800 days. The analysis is carried 
on over the whole period for the Chamber of deputies and, in order to use all the available information, for the 
republican period we also analyse the government survivals in either branch. 
The considered covariates for the Chamber of deputies from 1861 to 1994 (excluding the fascist period 
and the "Constituente") and for Senate in the republican period only (from 1948 to 1994) are the following: the 
number of seats; the number of parties represented in the considered branch of the parliament; the Shapley-
Shubik Index of voting power of the leading party; by means of dummy variables we distinguish the monarchic 
vs. the republican period, the restricted vs. the universal suffrage, the uninominal electoral system vs. the 
proportional system. For the political composition of the Parliament of the Kingdom we mainly refer to 
Malatesta (1940), who, however, gives only a broad political classification of the members of the parliament 
basically referred to their right or left “seat” in the parliament. A refinement of the classification of the 
parliamentary groups based on the parliamentary acts is in Piretti (1996) and in Bartolotta (1971). As for the 
republican period we refer to the official sources available, in particular La Navicella (2000 and 1985). 
Information about governments and legislatures durations are also available online at the official site of the 
parliament: www.parlamento.it. The variables related to the number of seats, the electoral system and the 
extension of the suffrage are built on the basis of the Italian electoral laws (most of which have been mentioned 
in section 2.3). 
All the considered variables are reported in table 2 that shows their mean, standard deviation, minimum 
and maximum value over the considered periods grouped by governments and legislatures. 
 14
Table 2. Summary statistics of the considered variables 
Variable by Governments  Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
(Chamber of Deputies from 1861 to  1994)          
Lenght of governments in days  107 344.72 262.856 8 1252
Lenght of legislatures in days  107 1414.96 424.829 452 2136
Restricted suffrage  107 0.45794 0.50057 0 1
Plurality electoral system  107 0.4486 0.49969 0 1
Republic  107 0.43925 0.49863 0 1
S-S index of the leading parties  107 0.60587 0.28004 0.101 1
Number of parties  107 7.70094 3.04747 3 14
seats  107 551.495 62.8672 443 630
(Chamber of Deputies from 1861 to  1924)  0       
Lenght of governments in days  60 362.467 284.311 8 1252
Lenght of legislatures in days  60 1289.08 474.278 452 2136
Restricted suffrage  60 0.81667 0.3902 0 1
Plurality electoral system  60 0.8 0.40338 0 1
S-S index of the leading parties  60 0.6686 0.34089 0.101 1
Number of parties  60 6.21667 3.17881 3 14
seats  60 499.633 23.9583 443 535
(Senate from 1948 to  1994)            
Lenght of governments in days  47 322.064 233.672 9 1058
Lenght of legislatures in days  47 1575.66 283.417 722 1874
S-S index of the leading parties  47 0.53598 0.07209 0.39762 0.64286
Number of parties  47 7.82979 1.10963 5 9
seats  47 306.17 33.2084 243 342
(Chamber of Deputies from 1948 to  1994)          
Lenght of governments in days  47 322.064 233.672 9 1058
Lenght of legislatures in days  47 1575.66 283.417 722 1874
S-S index of the leading parties  47 0.5258 0.14134 0.38442 1
Number of parties  47 9.59575 1.37777 8 13
seats  47 617.702 19.6047 574 630
Variables by Legislatures   Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
(Chamber of Deputies from 1861 to  1994)        
Lenght of legislatures in days   30 1288.63 471.713 452 2136
Number of parties   30 7.4 3.21205 3 14
Restricted suffrage   30 0.53333 0.50742 0 1
Plurality electoral system   30 0.46667 0.50742 0 1
S-S index of the leading parties   30 0.61808 0.29678 0.101 1
Republic   30 0.36667 0.49013 0 1
Seats    30 544.467 60.8575 443 630
(Chamber of Deputies from 1861 to  1924)           
Number of parties   19 5.94737 3.02717 3 14
Restricted suffrage   19 0.84211 0.37463 0 1
Plurality electoral system   19 0.73684 0.45241 0 1
Lenght of legislatures in days   19 1151.63 482.282 452 2136
S-S index of the leading parties   19 0.67054 0.34305 0.101 1
Seats    19 501.79 21.9484 443 535
(Chamber of Deputies from 1948 to  1994)           
Number of parties   11 9.90909 1.57826 8 13
Lenght of legislatures in days   11 1525.27 359.66 722 1874
S-S index of the leading parties   11 0.52746 0.17126 0.38442 1
Seats    11 618.182 20.8702 574 630
 
 
Table 3 reports the Cox PH estimates of the determinants (in terms of hazard ratio) of government 
duration in Italy from the unification to 1994 referring to the Chamber of deputies only. It turns out that the 
dummies capturing the republican period (as distinct from the monarchy) and the number of parties in the 
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chamber are not significant. The extension of the suffrage and the Shapley-Shubik index of the leading parties 
are significant and present hazard ratio much lower than unit, with the lowest hazard being for governments 
with the highest voting power for the leading party. The number of seats is significant, but the hazard quite 
close to unity indicates no relation with duration of government. Finally, the plurality electoral system (as 
distinct from proportional) is significant with hazard ratio much higher than unity indicating the highest hazard 
for the duration of those government under plurality with respect to those under proportional electoral system. 
 
Table 3. Government duration in the chamber of deputies 1861-1994, excluding the fascist period 
Cox regression -- Breslow method for ties 
No. of subjects      =          107                 
Number of obs        =          107 
No. of failures      =          107 
Time at risk         =        36885 
Log pseudolikelihood =   -390.89941 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
          _t   |Haz.Ratio   Rob.Std.Err.    z     P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
SS lead. Party |   .3428675   .0589748    -6.22   0.000      .244746    .4803269 
n.of parties   |   .9204824   .0486397    -1.57   0.117     .8299209    1.020926 
Plurality E.S. |   1.722632   .1519609     6.17   0.000      1.44912    2.047768 
restr.suffrage |   .4276038   .0605173    -6.00   0.000     .3240216    .5642989 
Republic       |   .8058512   .1214506    -1.43   0.152      .599749     1.08278 
n.of seats     |   1.001974   .0008698     2.27   0.023     1.000271     1.00368 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
Figures 2 and 3 show the survival function of governments from the estimated model (estimated at the 
mean of covariates and at the values 0 and 1 of the electoral system, fig.2, and the extension of the suffrage, 
fig.3) in the period 1861-1994. It clearly emerges that the survival of the governments under the proportional 
electoral system clearly dominates that under uninominal electoral system and that the survival of the 
governments under restricted suffrage dominates those elected under universal suffrage.  
 
 
Figure 2. The survival function from Cox PH regression system from 1861-1994 (for groups of 
governments distinguished by proportional and uninominal electoral)  
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Figure3. The survival function from Cox PH regression system from 1861-1994 (for groups of 
governments distinguished by universal vs. restricted suffrage) 
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We now report separate estimates both for the monarchic period and republican period, for the latter, 
we also consider the role of the Senate. 
Looking at the separate results for the pre-fascist legislatures (VIII to XXVI) - characterised by 
monarchy, plurality system (for all the legislatures excluding XV, XVI and XVII and XXV and XXI), restricted 
suffrage (since 1861 to 1913) followed by male universal suffrage (since XXIV legislature, 1913) - the results 
(table 4) confirm the negative relation between government survival and plurality system (the hazard ratio is  
about 1.61), as well as the positive relation between government duration and the high power in the parliament 
of the leading parties (the hazard ratio is  about 0.37). The restricted suffrage, the number of seats and the 
number of parties are not significant. Figure 4 reports the survival function of governments from the estimated 
model (estimated at the mean of covariates and at the values 0 and 1 of the electoral system) in the period 1861-
1924. It is interesting to notice that the curves in figure 4 have features similar to those of figure 2,  in spite of 
the shorter period of proportional electoral system considered. 
 
Table 4. government duration in the chamber of deputies 1861-1924. 
Cox regression -- Breslow method for ties 
No. of subjects      =           60                 
Number of obs        =           60 
No. of failures      =           60 
Time at risk         =        21748 
Log pseudolikelihood =   -185.45451  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          _t   | Haz. Ratio   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
SS lead. Party |   .3655316   .1211395    -3.04   0.002     .1909112    .6998718 
n.of parties   |    1.04679   .1157771     0.41   0.679     .8427813    1.300182 
plurality E.S. |   1.610576   .2515561     3.05   0.002     1.185856    2.187412 
restr.suffrage |   1.084475   .4733566     0.19   0.853      .460981    2.551266 
n.of seats     |   .9987218   .0035455    -0.36   0.719      .991797    1.005695 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Figure 4. Government duration: The survival function from Cox PH estimates for groups of 
governments distinguished by proportional and plurality electoral system from 1861-1924 
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Even for the monarchic period alone, the empirical results are contrary to the common view that the 
plurality system favours the stability of the governments. The reason may be that under this system the 
individual personalities are more important than the political programs and the party’s discipline. This 
obviously reduces the effectiveness of the voting power of the individual members of the parliament. On the 
other hand, the voting power of the leading party is still important for the survival of the governments, because 
the bigger this power the smaller the effect of a dissenting member (both in the parliament or in government’s 
coalition). The number of seats in the Chamber of deputies is not significant as well as the number of parties 
that increased with the extension of the suffrage, also not significant. A likely explanation can be found in the 
fact that the organized parties together with the male universal suffrage entered into the scene only in the 20th 
century immediately after the two shocks of the first world war and of the subsequent inflation, and 
immediately before of the dictatorship.  
Table 5 reports, for the post-fascist republican periods (1948-1994), the separate results for the 
Chamber of deputies and the Senate. The results show a different role played by the two branches of the 
parliament, over the same period, in determining government stability. This role results mainly driven by the 
political parties. On the one hand, in the Chamber of deputies, the government duration is positively affected by 
the number of parties and the S-S index of the leading party, whereas the number of seats is not significant. On 
the other hand, in the Senate, the only significant variable for government duration is  the number of parties 
with hazard ratio lower than unity.  
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Table 5. Government duration in the chamber of deputies and senate in the republican period 1948-1994.  
 
Chamber of deputies   
Cox regression -- Breslow method for ties 
No. of subjects      =           47                 
Number of obs        =           47 
No. of failures      =           47 
Time at risk         =        15137 
                                                   Wald chi2(3)    =     27.50 
Log pseudolikelihood =   -134.21072                Prob > chi2     =    0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
          _t   | Haz.Ratio   Rob.Std.Err.   z     P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
n.of parties   |   .7888244   .0448171    -4.18   0.000     .7056986    .8817417 
n.of seats     |   1.008108   .0064362     1.26   0.206     .9955721    1.020802 
SS lead. Party |   .2233991   .0655302    -5.11   0.000     .1257177     .396978 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Senate  
Cox regression -- Breslow method for ties 
No. of subjects      =           47                 
Number of obs        =           47 
No. of failures      =           47 
Time at risk         =        15137 
                                                   Wald chi2(3)    =      5.28 
Log pseudolikelihood =   -136.42882                Prob > chi2     =    0.1523 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
          _t   | Haz.Ratio   Rob.Std.Err.   z     P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
n. of parties  |   .8824738     .05269    -2.09   0.036     .7850169    .9920297 
n.of seats     |    .999991   .0053824    -0.00   0.999      .989497    1.010596 
SS lead. Party |   .4837346   1.116238    -0.31   0.753     .0052532     44.5442 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
Thus, the empirical results for the two branches of the parliament considered separately confirm that the driving 
forces of the survival of the governments under the proportional system are related to the number of parties 
and, only in the Chamber of Deputies, to the voting power of the leading party. The reason for difference in the 
branches of the parliament is that the Chamber of deputies and the Senate have, not only a different number of 
seats and of parties represented, which determine different values of the S-S index of the leading party, but also 
different internal regulations that have been often considered cause of different support to the governments. In 
the Italian parliamentary tradition, the political arena par excellence is the Chamber of deputies, where, 
generally, a crucial defeat determines the end of a government. Moreover, given that the number of senators is 
about half that of the deputies, for the minor parties the chances of being represented tend to be very small. 
Furthermore, the marginal senators of the minor parties have reduced chances are of being re-elected. This may 
explain why in the senate the increase in the number of parties lowers the hazard ratio of the governments more 
than in the chamber. 
 
3.3.2. Survival analysis of legislature duration 
On the basis of our dataset we now analyse the survival of the legislatures. All over the period we have now 30 
total observation representing 30 legislature, 26 of which are considered failures (anticipate end) over a total of 
38659 days (total analysis time at risk), with the last observed exit at t = 2136. Table 6 reports the results for 
the Italian legislatures’ duration, considering the Chamber of deputies only, from 1861-1994. All over the 
period, the legislature duration is significantly affected by the number of seats and the S-S index of all the 
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leading parties and the form of state (republic as distinguished by monarchy). The plurality electoral system,  
the number of parties,  the restricted suffrage are not significant. Notice that the only two variables showing 
hazard ratios much lower than 1 are the S-S index of the leading party and the republic, whereas the number of 
seats, although significant, having a hazard ratio almost equal to unity indicates no relation with the survival of 
the legislatures. Again the results confirm the relevance of the voting power of the leading parties for the  
survival of the political elite in democracy. Notice that, in this case, the voting power of the leading parties 
affects also the survival in the parliament of the members of the opposition 
A separate analysis of the monarchic and republican period is not possible because of the modest 
number of observations (corresponding to the legislatures).20  
 
Table 6. The determinants of legislatures’ duration : Chamber of Deputies from 1861-1994 (excluding 
the legislatures of the Fascist period) 
Cox regression -- no ties 
No. of subjects      =           30                 
Number of obs        =           30 
No. of failures      =           26 
Time at risk         =        38659 
                                                   Wald chi2(6)    =     40.40 
Log pseudolikelihood =    -60.55459                Prob > chi2     =    0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
            _t | Haz.Ratio   Rob.Std.Err.    z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
n.of parties   |   .9485749   .1803253    -0.28   0.781     .6535173    1.376848 
restr.suffrage |   5.250749   10.27157     0.85   0.397      .113525    242.8571 
Plurality E.S. |     .58394    .309191    -1.02   0.310     .2068543    1.648435 
SS lead. Party |   .0521838    .037885    -4.07   0.000     .0125768    .2165214 
Republic       |   .0154025   .0292458    -2.20   0.028     .0003727    .6365436 
n.of seats     |   1.030616   .0138986     2.24   0.025     1.003732     1.05822 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
In figure 5, the estimated survival function, related to the legislature duration for groups distinguished by 
monarchy  and republic from 1861-1994 show again the highest survival for those under the republican form of 
state (the hazard ratio is very low, about 0.015).  
 
Figure 5. Legislature duration: The survival function  for groups distinguished by monarchy and 
republic from 1861-1994 
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20 Actually, as before, for the republican period we have also studied the impact on the legislature duration of the 
covariates related to the Chamber of deputies and Senate. In this case, we have 11 total obs. for each branch. The number 
of observations is indeed too small to reach significant empirical results, which, therefore, are not reported. 
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4. Summary and conclusions  
Referring to some institutional features of the Italian parliament and to the role of the political parties - as 
captured by the number of parties and by their Shapley-Shubik index of voting power of those represented in 
the Italian Parliament - we have analysed the Italian democracy (from the unification to the end of the first 
republic (1861-1994), with the exclusion of the fascist period and of the subsequent transitory institutional 
period known as "Costituente") as for the durability of the Italian governments and legislatures. Our approach, 
based on survival analysis of government and legislature durations has given results, summarised in the tables 7 
and 8 in terms of hazard ratios, that differ from those prevailing in the political economy literature.  
In the Chamber of Deputies, over the whole period considered, from 1860 to 1994, the survival of the 
governments is inversely related to the plurality system. Either the restricted suffrage or the Shapley-Shubik 
index of voting power of the leading parties takes hazard ratio strictly lower than 1. The institutional form of 
the state, parliamentarian republic vs. constitutional monarchy is not significant all over the period as well as 
the number of parties. The number of seats is significant, but the hazard ratio almost equal to 1 indicates no 
relation with government survival. Separate estimates of sub-periods give details on the longer term estimates: 
In the monarchic period the voting powers of the prevailing parliamentary group is significant with hazard ratio 
lower than 1, moreover the hazard ratio for the plurality electoral system is much greater than 1, in spite of the 
reduced period of the proportional counterpart. Proportional electoral systems, believed to be responsible to a 
tendency to short living governments, are not causing the same instability as the plurality systems. In this 
respect, notice that not even in the republican period alone, the “political game” depicted in terms of Shapley-
Shubik index of voting power gave the (expected) picture of fragmentation of the decisional powers. Indeed, 
rather than a fragmented Parliament unable to produce a clear leading government because of the multitude of 
small political groups, it emerged a clear cut between the power of the main parties  and those of all the other 
minor parties. Yet the role of parties (the increase of their number) becomes unexpectedly crucial in the 
estimates of the post war parliament which also consider the role of  the senate.  
 
 
Table 7. Summary of the results: survival analysis of government duration 
  
Chamber of Deputies 
(1861-1994) 
 
Monarchy: 
Chamber of 
Deputies 
(1861-1924) 
Republic: 
Chamber of 
Deputies 
(1948-1994) 
Republic: 
Senate (1948-
1996) 
Plurality electoral system H.R.>1 H.R.>1   
Number of parties N.S. N.S. H.R.<1 H.R.<1 
number of seats  H.R.≅ 1 N.S. N.S. N.S. 
restricted suffrage H.R.<1 N.S.   
Republic =1 after 1948 and 0 otherwise N.S.    
S.S. index leading party H.R.<1 H.R.<1 H.R.<1 N.S. 
N.S.   = not significant at 5% 
H.R.   = hazard ratio 
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Table 8. Summary of the results: survival analysis of legislature duration 
  
Chamber of Deputies 
(1861-1994) 
Plurality electoral system N.S. 
Number of parties N.S. 
number of seats  H.R.≅ 1 
restricted suffrage N.S. 
Republic =1 after 1948 and 0 otherwise H.R.<1 
S.S. index leading party H.R.<1 
N.S.   = not significant at 5% 
H.R.   = hazard ratio 
 
 
As for the survival of the Italian legislatures, considering the Chamber from 1861-1994, the number of 
seats, the S-S index of all the leading parties, and the republican form of state are significant, the restricted 
suffrage, the number of parties and the electoral system are not significant. 
 It is clear that, contrary to what has been often asserted, pure plurality reduces the chances of survival 
of governments and does not affect the legislature length in comparison with proportional system. Moreover a 
fractioned party system does not affect negatively the survival of governments and is not significant for 
legislatures. On the contrary, it plays a role in the period in which the party-system is consolidated.  
However, admittedly, the governments in Italy had a short life under either system and the interruption 
of legislatures before the natural term occurred both in the monarchic and in the republican periods.  
As seen, Alesina and Perotti (1994)21 argue that short living governments may not be damaging in calm 
periods, whereas they become negatively crucial in critical situations, such as those following an economic 
shock or an international crisis. However, at this stage of research, this thesis has not yet a strong empirical 
support for the Italian democracy both in the monarchic and in the republican period. The explanation might be 
found in the fact that those governments succeeding to each other, originated, for prolonged periods, from the 
same elite considered coherent in the long run. In some situation, perhaps the most critical, the ruling elite 
produced high-quality leaders. In the monarchic period the right-wing governments were constantly in power 
from 1861 to 1876, during 5 legislatures of about 3 years each with 11 different premiers for 15 different 
governments, each pursuing a similar liberal right-wing policy under the initial leadership of Cavour and of the 
leader of the economic and fiscal policy, Quintino Sella. These “short living” governments, ruling the new 
Kingdom of Italy, were facing a very critical fiscal situation because of the huge public debt inherited from 
previous states and the huge deficit of the public finances of the new unitary state. With a rigorous long run 
fiscal policy they were able to reduce the initial deficit, while undertaking important infrastructural public 
                                                     
21 Alesina and Perotti (1994) support their view on fragmentation on the basis of Drazen and Grilli (1993), Grilli, 
Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991). 
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expenditures. In the subsequent period, the so called “historical left” (i.e., the left wing liberals) ruled from 
1876 to 1890 over  7 legislatures, with 7 different prime ministers for 11 governments of the same orientation. 
In this period, the orientation of the fiscal policy was more permissive. On the other hand, from 1903 to 1914, a 
period of moderate liberal orientation, 8 different premiers succeeded to each other in 11 governments. This 
period, characterized by the first Italian economic miracle, was dominated by the figure (and political program) 
of Antonio Giolitti. In the Italian republic, in spite of its 47 government (on average, about 4 for each 
legislature), all the legislatures of the two post world war decades from 1948 to 1968, as noted by La 
Palombara (1988), showed a substantial political continuity, with DC always as a solid leading party. In this 
long  period after a phase of pure “centrist” policy there was a cautious opening to a moderate centre left line. 
Thus, the “short living” centrist DC governments from 1948 to 1961 were able to fight the inflation, to restore 
the public finances and to create the conditions for a period of high economic growth that was called “economic 
miracle”. The elite of the first period offered leaders as Alcide De Gasperi, Luigi Einaudi and Ezio Vanoni, 
respectively, in political, economic and fiscal matters. On the other hand, in the ‘60s, the centre left 
governments, with DC leaders and socialists in the government coalitions, were able to overcome the 
inflationary trend caused by the prolonged cycle of high economic expansion with neither a deflation nor a 
worsening of the ratio of the public debt to GDP: the ratio of state debt to GDP in the 1970 was still a mere 
34% as that of the previous decade. High deficits and high inflation appeared afterwards and the voting power 
of DC declined.22 Governments, in spite of their duration, may have been weak because of the modest voting 
power of their majority. These observations, obviously, do not imply a preference for short living governments. 
Nevertheless a too prolonged stability, reduces the circulation of the political elites and may reduce the 
dynamic efficiency of the system. This may  happen  in a market economy with big firms dominating the 
market. The struggle for survival of the political elites governing the country, in a Schumpeterian perspective 
(Fedeli and Forte, 2010), must leave enough room for an efficient pursuance of their own programs both in 
emergency and in good periods. Yet, under short living governments, bureaucracies and interest groups may 
become more influential in the daily choices: legislation may become more complex, structural reforms may 
require more time to be accomplished and, in case, may become unduly complex. In sum, the circulation of the 
governing elites assures competition, as that of monopolies in the Schumpeterian theory, but their survival may 
assure dynamic efficiency and effectiveness. An equilibrium point has to be found as for the duration of 
governments. Indeed, governments shorter than the legislature appear an anomaly. Therefore, the question 
remains on the causes of the short living governments in Italy both under uninominal or proportional electoral 
systems both in the monarchic and in the republican period. If the electoral systems do not matter and the 
constitutional monarchy and the democratic republic do not matter either, other variables of institutional, 
sociological, political and economic nature have to be found. As for the institutional variables, the distribution 
powers between the head of the state and of the government, on the one hand, and the parliament, on the other, 
may be relevant. Under the Italian “parliamentary regime”, in both the monarchic and the republican system, 
                                                     
22 On the relation between the change in voting power of the dominant party and the change in deficit, see Fedeli and Forte 
(2003). 
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the head of the state must dismiss the government whenever the parliament denies it a confidence vote 
politically relevant and the head of the government has limited powers. A sociological factor that may explain 
the “Italian peculiarity” of short living government even with long living legislatures is the regional rivalry 
among the North, the Centre and the South an even among regions of these same three areas. It may be that 
under a federalist system the regional rivalries are reduced at the central state level because of the greater 
autonomy at the lower levels of government. A peculiar political factor present in the republican period has 
been the impossibility, for foreign policy reasons, for the biggest left wing party, the communist party, to guide 
a left wing government, before the fall of the Berlin wall. The left was thus split and only the major parties on 
the centre or on the right could form the governments. Among the economic factors for the short life of 
Governments key macro economic variables, as the rate of inflation, the rates of unemployment and of 
economic growth have been found of scarce impact by Warwick (1994) who shows that the ideological 
diversity is the main destabilizing factor of governments. As for the Italian case, prima facie, one can note  that 
there were short living governments with either low or high rates of unemployment, of inflation and of growth. 
Other explanations have been given in terms of game theory (see Laver 2003). Further research may be useful 
to throw light on the “Italian peculiarity”. 
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Appendix 1  
 
Table A1. The Italian Governments from 1861 to 1924: plurality electoral system (1861-1882) and (1892-1919); 
proportional electoral system by means of the “scrutiny of lists” (1882-1992) and (1919-1924) 
 Governments-Prime minister Days of government Days of  legislature. 
VIII legislature (February  18, 1861 -  September  7 , 1865) 1661
Plurality system Camillo Benso Cavour 81  
 Bettino Ricasoli 246  
 Urbano Rattizzi 280  
 Luigi Carlo Farini 106  
 Marco Minghetti 553  
 Alfonso Lamarmora 459  
IX legislature (November 18, 1865 - February  13, 1867) 452
Plurality system Alfonso Lamarmora 171  
 Bettino Ricasoli 238  
X legislature (March 22, 1867 -  November 2, 1870)  1320
Plurality system Bettino Ricasoli 19  
 Urbano Rattizzi 200  
 Luigi Federico Manabrea  70  
 Luigi Federico Manabrea  493  
 Luigi Federico Manabrea  215  
 Giovanni Lanza 323  
XI legislature (December  6, 1870 - September 20, 1874) 1384
Plurality system Giovanni Lanza 947  
 Marco Minghetti 437  
XII legislature (November 23, 1874 - October, 3,  1876)  680
Plurality system Marco Minghetti 487  
 Agostino Depretis 191  
XIII legislature (November 29, 1876 -  May 2, 1880)  1258
Plurality system Agostino Depretis 489  
 Benedetto Cairoli 270  
 Agostino Depretis 207  
 Benedetto Cairoli 292  
XIV legislature (May 26, 1880 -  October 2,1882)  859
Plurality system Benedetto Cairoli 368  
 Agostino Depretis 491  
XV legislature (November 22, 1882 -  April 27, 1886)  1251
Proportional sistem (scrutinio di lista) Agostino Depretis 1252  
XVI legislature (June 10, 1886 -  October 22, 1890)  1594
Proportional sistem (scrutinio di lista) Agostino Depretis 414  
 Francesco Crispi 1180  
XVII legislature (December 10, 1890 - September 27, 1892) 656
Proportional sistem (scrutinio di lista) Francesco Crispi 58  
 Antonio Di Rudinì 463  
 Giovanni Giolitti 135  
XVIII legislature (23 November 1892 - 8 May 1895)  896
Plurality system Giovanni Giolitti 387  
 Francesco Crispi 509  
XIX Legislature (10 June 1895 - 2 March 1897)  630
Plurality system   Francesco Crispi 273  
   Antonio Di Rudinì 357  
XX Legislature (5 April 1897 - 17 May 1900)  1137
Plurality system Antonio Di Rudinì 450  
 Luigi Pelloux 322  
XXI Legislature (16 June 1900 - 18 October 1904)  1584
Plurality system Luigi Pelloux 8  
 Giuseppe Saracco 236  
 Giuseppe Zanardelli 960  
 Giovanni Giolitti 350  
XXII Legislature (30 November 1904 - 8 February 1909) 1530
Plurality system Giovanni Giolitti 102  
 Tommaso Tittoni 16  
 Alessandro Fortis 317  
 Sidney Sonnino 110  
 Giovanni Giolitti 985  
XXIII Legislature (24 March 1909 - 29 September 1913)  1649
Plurality system Giovanni Giolitti 262  
 Sidney Sonnino 110  
 Luigi Luzzati 365  
 Giovanni Giolitti 913  
XXIV Legislature (27 November 1913 - 29 September 1919) 2131
Plurality system Giovanni Giolitti 114  
 Antonio Salandra 819  
 Paolo Boselli 498  
 Vittorio Emanuele Orlando 602  
 Francesco Saverio Nitti 98  
XXV Legislature (1 December 1919 - 7 April 1921)  492
Proportional sistem (scrutinio di lista) Francesco Saverio Nitti 196  
 Giovanni Giolitti 296  
XXVI Legislature (11 June 1921 - 25 January 1924)  958
Proportional sistem (scrutinio di lista) Giovanni Giolitti 23  
 Ivanoe Bonomi 237  
 Luigi Facta 247  
 Benito Mussolini 451  
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Table A2. The Italian Governments  from 1948 to 1994: pure proportional electoral system. 
 Governments-Prime minister Days of government Days of  legislature. 
I Legislature (8 May 1948 - 24 June 1953)  1874 
 5   De Gasperi Government 599  
 6   De Gasperi Government 535  
 7   De Gasperi Government 704  
II Legislature (25 June 1953 - 11 June 1958)  1813 
 8   De Gasperi Government 12  
 1   Pella Government 141  
 1   Fanfani Government 12  
 1   Scelba Government 497  
 1   Segni Government 670  
 1   Zoli Government 396  
III Legislature (12 June 1958 - 15 May 1963)  1799 
 2   Fanfani Government 209  
 2   Segni Government 374  
 1   Tambroni Government 116  
 3   Fanfani Government 556  
 4   Fanfani Government 449  
IV Legislature (16 May 1963 - 14 May 1968)  1847 
 1   Leone Government 141  
 1   Moro Government 205  
 2   Moro Government 548  
 3   Moro Government 833  
V Legislature (5 June 1968 – 24 May 1972)  1450 
 2   Leone Government 148  
 1   Rumor Government 205  
 2   Rumor Government 186  
 3   Rumor Government 101  
 1   Colombo Government 527  
 1   Andreotti Government 9  
VI Legislature (25 May 1972 - 4 July 1976)  1502 
 2   Andreotti Government 351  
 4   Rumor Government 230  
 5   Rumor Government 203  
 4   Moro Government 410  
 5   Moro Government 78  
VII Legislature (5 July 1976 - 19 June 1979)  1080 
 3   Andreotti Government 536  
 4   Andreotti Government 326  
 5   Andreotti Government 11  
VIII Legislature (20 June 1979 - 11 July 1983)  1483 
 1   Cossiga Government 228  
 2   Cossiga Government 177  
 1   Forlani Government 220  
 1   Spadolini Government 405  
 2   Spadolini Government 82  
 5   Fanfani Government 152  
IX Legislature (12 July 1983 - 1   July 1987)  1451 
 1   Craxi Government 1058  
 2   Craxi Government 214  
 6   Fanfani Government 11  
X Legislature (2 July 1987 - 22 April 1992)  1757 
 1   Goria Government 227  
 1   De Mita Government 401  
 6   Andreotti Government 615  
 7   Andreotti Government 378  
XI Legislature (23 April 1992 - 14 April 1994)  722 
 1   Amato Government 298  
 1   Ciampi Government 353  
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Table A3. The Shapley-Shubik indexes of voting power for the Italian parties from 1861 to 1994 
 
Legislature  
(beginning-end date) 
Total 
Seats Political group 
n. of 
seats share of seats S-S INDEX 
VIII 
(18 February 1861 - 7 September 1865) 443 
destra 187 42.21% 0.400 
sinistra 118 26.64% 0.233 
estrema  15 3.39% 0.233 
INDEFINIBILI 32 7.22% 0.067 
indipendenti_filogovernativi_ministeriali 91 20.54% 0.067 
IX 
(18 November 1865 - 13 February 1867) 443 
destra 183 41.31% 0.333 
sinistra 155 34.99% 0.333 
estrema  16 3.61% 0 
indipendenti_filogovernativi_ministeriali 89 20.09% 0.333 
X 
(22 March 1867 - 2 November 1870) 493 
destra 223 45.23% 0.333 
sinistra 181 36.71% 0.333 
estrema 18 3.65% 0 
indipendenti_filogovernativi_ministeriali 71 14.40% 0.333 
XI 
(5 December 1870 - 20 September 1874) 508 
destra 243 47.83% 0.500 
sinistra 185 36.42% 0.167 
estrema  13 2.56% 0.167 
indipendenti_filogovernativi_ministeriali 67 13.19% 0.167 
XII 
(23 November 1874 - 3 October 1876) 508 
destra 225 44.29% 0.333 
sinistra 221 43.50% 0.333 
estrema  13 2.56% 0 
indipendenti_filogovernativi_ministeriali 49 9.65% 0.333 
XIII 
(20 November 1876 - 2 May 1880) 
 
 
508 
destra 125 24.61% 0 
sinistra 309 60.83% 1.000 
estrema  28 5.51% 0 
indipendenti  46 9.06% 0 
XIV 
(26 May 1880 - 2 October 1882) 508 
destra 171 33.66% 0.333 
sinistra ministeriale 218 42.91% 0.333 
sinistra dissidente 119 23.43% 0.333 
XV 
(22 November 1882 - 27 April 1886) 508 
sinistra ministeriale 290 57.09% 1.000 
sinistra dissidente 19 3.74% 0 
opposizione costituzionale (destra) 144 28.35% 0 
radicali 42 8.27% 0 
indipendenti 13 2.56% 0 
XVI 
(10 June 1886 - 22 October 1890) 508 
ministeriali (sx+dx) 293 57.68% 1.000 
dissidenti (sx+dx)?? 13 2.56% 0 
opposiz costituz subalpina  
(di sinistra con giolitti e zanardelli) 13 2.56% 0 
pentarchi/progressisti (protezionisti) 145 28.54% 0 
radicali 44 8.66% 0 
XVII 
(10 December 1890 - 27 September 1892) 508 
ministeriali (sinistra) 230 45.28% 0.500 
destra indipendente 60 11.81% 0.167 
ministeriali (indipendenti filogov) 167 32.87% 0.167 
radicali 51 10.04% 0.167 
XVIII 
(23 November 1892 - 8 May 1895 508 
sinistra 245 48.23% 0.714 
centro sinistra 31 6.10% 0.048 
destra 76 14.96% 0.048 
centro destra 64 12.60% 0.048 
incerti 36 7.09% 0.048 
radicali 27 5.31% 0.048 
estrema 29 5.71% 0.048 
XIX 
(10 June 1895 - 2 March 1897) 508 
ministeriali 334 65.75% 1.000 
opposizione costituzionale 104 20.47%   
radicale 47 9.25%   
socialista 15 2.95%   
incerti 8 1.57%   
XX (37 mesi) 
(5 April 1897 - 17 May 1900) 508  
ministeriali 327 64.37% 1.000 
opposizione costituzionale 99 19.49%   
radicali 42 8.27%   
repubblicani 25 4.92%   
socialisti 15 2.95%   
XXI 
 (16 June 1900 - 18 October 1904) 508 
ministeriali 296 58.27% 1.000 
opposizione costituzionale 116 22.83%   
radicale 34 6.69%   
 30
socialista 33 6.50%   
repubblicano 29 5.71%   
XXII 
(30 November 1904 - 8 February 1909) 508 
ministeriali  339 66.73% 1.000 
opposizione costituzionale 76 14.96%   
radicale 37 7.28%   
socialista 29 5.71%   
repubblicano 24 4.72%   
cattolico 3 0.59%   
XXIII 
(24 March 1909 - 29 September 1913) 508 
ministeriali 312 61.42% 1.000 
opposizione costituzionale 70 13.78%   
radicale 45 8.86%   
socialista 41 8.07%   
repubblicano 24 4.72%   
cattolico 16 3.15%   
XXIV 
(27 November 1913 - 29 September 1919) 508 
liberale 270 53.15% 1.000 
cattolico 20 3.94%   
costituzionali democratici 29 5.71%   
democratico 11 2.17%   
conservatori cattolici 9 1.77%   
radicale 62 12.20%   
radicale dissidente 11 2.17%   
socialista ufficiale 52 10.24%   
socialista riformista 19 3.74%   
socialista indipendente sindacal 8 1.57%   
repubblicano 8 1.57%   
repubblicani indipendenti 9 1.77%   
XXV 
(1 December 1919 - 7 April 1921) 508 
liberale (PLI) 41 8.07% 0.053 
democratico sociale 60 11.81% 0.085 
radicale 12 2.36% 0.015 
socialista ufficiale (PSI) 156 30.71% 0.391 
socialista unionista e riformista 6 1.18% 0.008 
socialista indipendente  1 0.20% 0 
repubblicano 9 1.77% 0.009 
popolare 100 19.69% 0.219 
combattente 20 3.94% 0.019 
economico 7 1.38% 0.009 
liberale democratico e radicale 96 18.90% 0.192 
XXVI 
(11 June 1921 - 25 January 1924) 535 
liberale 43 8.04% 0.091 
liberale democratico  68 12.71% 0.101 
democratico sociale 29 5.42% 0.059 
democratico riformista 11 2.06% 0.018 
socialista ITALIANO 123 22.99% 0.247 
socialista indipendente 1 0.19% 0.002 
repubblicano 6 1.12% 0.009 
popolare 108 20.19% 0.208 
combattenti 10 1.87% 0.016 
blocchi nazionali 105 19.63% 0.202 
economico 5 0.93% 0.008 
comunista 15 2.80% 0.023 
slavi e tedeschi 9 1.68% 0.014 
fascista 2 0.37% 0.003 
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    CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES  SENATE 
  PARLIAMENTARY GROUPS Seats 
Voting 
Weight 
Shapley-
Shubik 
Index Seats 
Voting 
Weight 
Shapley-
Shubik 
Index 
I Legislature  
(18 April 1948 –  
6 June 1953) 
  
  
  
DEMOCRATICO CRISTIANO(DC) 306 0,5331 1 150 0,4386 0.63095 
SOCIALDEMOCRATICO UNITA' SOCIALISTA 33 0,05749 0 23 0,06725 0.07857 
REPUBBLICANO 10 0,01742 0 12 0,03509 0.03095 
DEMOCRATICO INDIPENDENTE DI SINISTRA       10 0,02924 0.0119 
SOCIALISTA ITALIANO 52 0,09059 0 41 0,11988 0.07857 
COMUNISTA 131 0,22822 0 67 0,19591 0.07857 
LIBERALE 15 0,02613 0 10 0,02924 0.0119 
NAZIONALE MONARCHICO 13 0,02265 0      
MISTO  14 0,02439 0 29 0,08479 0.07857 
TOTALE 574 1 1 342 1 1 
II Legislature  
(7 June 1953 – 24 
May 1958) 
  
  
  
  
DEMOCRATICO CRISTIANO(DC) 262 0,44407 0.57738 111 0,45679 0.64286 
LIBERALE 14 0,02373 0.025      
SOCIALDEMOCRATICO 19 0,0322 0.025      
LIBERO-SOCIAL-REPUBBLICANO       10 0,04115 0.02381 
DEMOCRATICO INDIPENDENTE DI SINISTRA       10 0,04115 0.02381 
SOCIALISTA ITALIANO 75 0,12712 0.10119 28 0,11523 0.07143 
COMUNISTA 143 0,24237 0.10119 49 0,20165 0.07143 
MONARCHICO POPOLARE            
NAZIONALE MONARCHICO 39 0,0661 0.10119 15 0,06173 0.07143 
MOVIMENTO SOCIALE ITALIANO 29 0,04915 0.05357 9 0,03704 0.02381 
MISTO 9 0,01525 0.01548 11 0,04527 0.07143 
TOTALE 590 1 1 243 1 1 
III Legislature  
(25 May 1958 – 15 
May 1963) 
  
  
  
  
DEMOCRATICO CRISTIANO(DC) 273 0,45805 0.59524 122 0,48221 0.6 
SOCIALDEMOCRATICO  22 0,03691 0.04762      
REPUBBLICANO            
SOCIALISTA ITALIANO 84 0,14094 0.08333 36 0,1423 0.1 
COMUNISTA 140 0,2349 0.08333 57 0,2253 0.1 
LIBERALE 17 0,02852 0.04762      
MONARCHICO POPOLARE 14 0,02349 0.03571      
NAZIONALE MONARCHICO 11 0,01846 0.02976      
MOVIMENTO SOCIALE E NAZIONALE MONARCHICO       10 0,03952 0.1 
MOVIMENTO SOCIALE ITALIANO 24 0,04027 0.04762      
MISTO  11 0,01846 0.02976 28 0,11067 0.1 
TOTALE 596 1 1 253 1 1 
IV Legislature  
(16 May 1963 – 
14 May 1968) 
 
  
  
DEMOCRATICO CRISTIANO (DC) 260 0.4127 0.51984 134 0.41745 0.53571 
SOCIALISTA ITALIANO (PSI) 62 0.09841 0.1246 32 0.09969 0.11667 
COMUNISTA(PCI) 166 0.26349 0.1246 83 0.25857 0.11667 
SOCIALDEMOCRATICO (PSDI) 32 0.05079 0.05794 14 0.04361 0.03095 
REPUBBLICANO (PRI) 5 0.00794 0.00397      
LIBERALE (PLI) 38 0.06032 0.06111 19 0.05919 0.06905 
SOCIALISTA IT. UNITA’ PROLETARIA 25 0.03968 0.05 12 0.03738 0.03095 
DEMOCRATICO UNITA’ MONARCHICA 8 0.0127 0.00397      
MOVIMENTO SOCIALE ITALIANO (MSI) 27 0.04286 0.05 17 0.05296 0.06905 
MISTO 7 0.01111 0.00397 10 0.03115 0.03095 
TOTAL 630 1 1 321 1 1 
  
V Legislature 
(5 June 1968 –  
24 May 1972) 
  
   
  
  
COMUNISTA 171 0.27143 0.16508 77 0.23913 0.12024 
DEMOCRATICO CRISTIANO 265 0.42063 0.46389 137 0.42547 0.52976 
PSI E PSDI UNIFICATI 91 0.14444 0.16508 46 0.14286 0.12024 
LIBERALE  31 0.04921 0.07579 16 0.04969 0.0631 
REPUBBLICANO 9 0.01429 0.00913      
MOVIMENTO SOCIALE ITALIANO  24 0.0381 0.05317 13 0.04037 0.05357 
DEM. UNITA’ MONARCHICA 6 0.00952 0.00556      
SOC. IT. UNITA’ PROLETARIA 23 0.03651 0.05317 13 0.04037 0.05357 
SINISTRA INDIPENDENTE       12 0.03727 0.05357 
MISTO 10 0.01587 0.00913 8 0.02484 0.00595 
TOTALE 630 1 1 322 1 1 
  
VI Legislature 
 (25 May 1972 – 
4July 1976) 
  
 
  
COMUNISTA 175 0.27778 0.12976 82 0.25466 0.12619 
DEMOCRATICO CRISTIANO 265 0.42063 0.53452 136 0.42236 0.53571 
SOCIALISTA ITALIANO 61 0.09683 0.12976 36 0.1118 0.12619 
LIBERALE  20 0.03175 0.02024 10 0.03106 0.02143 
SOCIALDEMOCRATICO 30 0.04762 0.03452 12 0.03727 0.02143 
REPUBBLICANO 15 0.02381 0.01071      
MOVIMENTO SOCIALE ITALIANO  55 0.0873 0.12976 26 0.08075 0.12619 
SINISTRA INDIPENDENTE       11 0.03416 0.02143 
MISTO 9 0.01429 0.01071 9 0.02795 0.02143 
TOTALE 630 1 1 322 1 1 
  
VII Legislature 
 (5 July 1976 –  
19 June 1979) 
  
  
 
  
COMUNISTA 222 0.35238 0.19524 99 0.30745 0.14524 
DEMOCRATICO CRISTIANO 262 0.41587 0.42619 136 0.42236 0.49524 
SOCIALISTA ITALIANO 57 0.09048 0.19524 31 0.09627 0.14524 
SOCIALDEMOCRATICO ITALIANO 15 0.02381 0.02659      
REPUBBLICANO 14 0.02222 0.02262      
LIBERALE  5 0.00794 0.01151      
SOCIALDEMOCRATICO E LIBERALE        10 0.03106 0.02857 
PARTITO RADICALE 4 0.00635 0.00754      
DEMOCRAZIA PROLETARIA 6 0.00952 0.01349      
MOVIMENTO SOCIALE ITALIANO  34 0.05397 0.08492 15 0.04658 0.0619 
SINISTRA INDIPENDENTE       18 0.0559 0.07857 
MISTO 11 0.01746 0.01667 13 0.04037 0.04524 
TOTALE 630 1 1 322 1 1 
  
VIII Legislature 
(20 June 1979 –  
11 July 1983) 
  
  
 
  
COMUNISTA 193 0.30635 0.15556 95 0.29503 0.12381 
DEMOCRATICO CRISTIANO 262 0.41587 0.46587 139 0.43168 0.52381 
SOCIALISTA ITALIANO 61 0.09683 0.15556 32 0.09938 0.12381 
LIBERALE  9 0.01429 0.01746      
SOCIALDEMOCRATICO ITALIANO 20 0.03175 0.03889 10 0.03106 0.0381 
REPUBBLICANO 16 0.0254 0.03095 7 0.02174 0.01905 
MOVIMENTO SOCIALE ITALIANO DN 29 0.04603 0.06429 13 0.04037 0.05741 
PARTITO RADICALE 17 0.02698 0.03294      
UNITA’ PROL. PER IL COMUNISMO (PDUP) 6 0.00952 0.00556      
SINISTRA INDIPENDENTE       16 0.04969 0.07619 
MISTO 17 0.02698 0.03294 10 0.03106 0.0381 
TOTALE 630 1 1 322 1 1 
  
IX Legislature 
 (12 July 1983 –  
1 July 1987) 
COMUNISTA 177 0.28095 0.20545 91 0.28173 0.19762 
DEMOCRATICO CRISTIANO 226 0.35873 0.38442 121 0.37461 0.39762 
SOCIALISTA ITALIANO 73 0.11587 0.1614 39 0.12074 0.1619 
SOCIALDEMOCRATICO ITALIANO 22 0.03492 0.0364 9 0.02786 0.03095 
REPUBBLICANO 29 0.04603 0.04672 12 0.03715 0.03095 
 32
  
 
  
  
  
LIBERALE  16 0.0254 0.02489 6 0.01858 0.03095 
MOVIMENTO SOCIALE DN 42 0.06667 0.06894 18 0.05573 0.05952 
PARTITO RADICALE (PR) 11 0.01746 0.01656      
DEMOCRAZIA PROLETARIA 7 0.0111 0.0102      
SINISTRA INDIPENDENTE 20 0.03175 0.03481 18 0.05573 0.05952 
MISTO 7 0.01111 0.01021 9 0.02768 0.03095 
TOTALE 630 1 1 323 1 1 
  
 X Legislature  
(2 July 1987 –  
22 April 1992) 
  
  
 
  
  
COMUNISTA 157 0.24921 0.18961 85 0.26235 0.17698 
DEMOCRATICO CRISTIANO 234 0.37143 0.42006 127 0.39198 0.44127 
SOCIALISTA ITALIANO 94 0.14921 0.18961 45 0.13889 0.17698 
SOCIALDEMOCRATICO ITALIANO 17 0.02698 0.02294 7 0.0216 0.02103 
REPUBBLICANO 21 0.03333 0.02908 9 0.02778 0.0246 
LIBERALE  11 0.01746 0.01479      
MOVIMENTO SOCIALE  DN 35 0.05556 0.05447 16 0.04938 0.0496 
FEDERATIVO EUROPEO       6 0.01852 0.01389 
FEDERALISTA EUROPEO (PR) 12 0.01905 0.01566      
DEMOCRAZIA PROLETARIA 8 0.0127 0.01003      
SINISTRA INDIPENDENTE 20 0.03175 0.02691 17 0.05247 0.05675 
VERDE  13 0.02063 0.01681      
MISTO 8 0.0127 0.01003 12 0.03704 0.03889 
TOTALE 630 1 1 324 1 1 
  
XI Legislature 
 (23 April 1992 –  
14 April 1994) 
  
 
  
DEMOCRATICI DI SINISTRA & RIFONDAZI0NE 
COMUNISTA 142 0.2254 0.20274 86 0.2638 0.21905 
DEMOCRATICO CRISTIANO 206 0.32698 0.3873 112 0.34356 0.38571 
SOCIALISTA ITALIANO 92 0.14603 0.16082 51 0.15644 0.18571 
LIBERALE  17 0.02698 0.02237      
SOCIALDEMOCRATICO ITALIANO 16 0.0254 0.02035      
REPUBBLICANO 27 0.04286 0.03608 12 0.03681 0.05238 
MOVIMENTO SOCIALE DN 34 0.05397 0.04199 16 0.04908 0.05238 
FED. EUROPEO (LISTA PANNELLA) 6 0.00952 0.00902      
LA RETE 12 0.01905 0.01573      
LEGA NORD 55 0.0873 0.07424 25 0.07669 0.05238 
VERDI  16 0.0254 0.02035      
MISTO 7 0.01111 0.00902 24 0.07362 0.05238 
TOTALE 630 1 1 326 1 1 
  
 XI Legislature  
(23 April 1992 –  
14 April 1994) 
  
  
 
  
DEMOCRATICI DI SINISTRA (PDS) 107 0.16984 0.15459 66 0.20245 0.17976 
DEMOCRATICO CRISTIANO 206 0.32698 0.41465 112 0.34356 0.42738 
RIFONDAZIONE COMUNISTA 35 0.05556 0.0425 20 0.06135 0.04167 
PARTITO SOCIALISTA ITALIANO 92 0.14603 0.13691 51 0.15644 0.15595 
LIBERALE  17 0.02698 0.02259      
SOCIALDEMOCRATICO ITALIANO 16 0.0254 0.02089      
REPUBBLICANO 27 0.04286 0.035 12 0.03681 0.04167 
FED. EUROPEO (LISTA PANNELLA) 6 0.00952 0.01043      
MOVIMENTO SOCIALE DN 34 0.05397 0.042 16 0.04908 0.04167 
LA RETE 12 0.01905 0.01664      
LEGA NORD 55 0.0873 0.07187 25 0.07669 0.05595 
VERDI  16 0.0254 0.02089      
MISTO 7 0.01111 0.01104 24 0.07362 0.05595 
TOTALE 630 1 1 326 1 1 
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